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Abstract
Information is a critical asset on which virtually all modern organizations depend
upon to meet their operational mission objectives. Military organizations, in particular,
have embedded Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) into their core
mission processes as a means to increase their operational efficiency, exploit automation,
improve decision quality, and shorten the kill chain. However, the extreme dependence
upon ICT results in an environment where a cyber incident can result in severe mission
degradation, or possibly failure, with catastrophic consequences to life, limb, and
property. These consequences can be minimized by maintaining real-time situational
awareness of mission critical resources so appropriate contingency actions can be taken
in a timely manner following an incident in order to assure mission success.
In this thesis, the design and analysis of an experiment is presented for the
purpose of measuring the utility of a Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment
(CIMIA) notification process, whose goal is to improve the timeliness and relevance of
incident notification. In the experiment, subjects are placed into a model environment
where they conduct operational tasks in the presence and absence of enhanced CIMIA
notifications. The results of the experiment reveal that implementing a CIMIA
notification process significantly reduced the response time required for subjects to
recognize and take proper contingency actions to assure their organizational mission.
The research confirms that timely and relevant notification following a cyber incident is
an essential element of mission assurance.
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MEASURING THE UTILITY OF A CYBER INCIDENT MISSION IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (CIMIA) PROCESS FOR MISSION ASSURANCE
I. Introduction
Information is a critical asset, on which organizations depend to meet mission
objectives. Military organizations, in particular, have embedded Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT) into their core mission processes as a means to
increase their operational efficiency, exploit automation, improve decision quality, and
shorten the kill chain (Grimaila et al., 2009a). However, the increasing dependence upon
ICT has resulted in an environment where an incident involving a cyber resource,
hereafter called a “cyber incident,” can result in severe mission degradation or failure
with catastrophic consequences to life, limb, and property (Grimaila et al., 2010). Even
organizations that build and maintain robust security capabilities will enviably experience
a cyber incident resulting from external attacks, insider attackers, natural disasters,
human errors, infrastructure degradation, or equipment failure (Grimaila et al., 2007).
When a cyber incident occurs, it is essential to notify all decision makers whose missions
are potentially affected in a timely and relevant manner in order to assure mission
success.
1.1 Background
In a military context, information is continuously being collected, processed and
analyzed, aggregated, stored, and distributed for multiple purposes, including support of
situational awareness, operations planning, and command decision making (Grimaila et
al., 2008a). Military organizations exhibit unique attributes such as high levels of
1

sustained information interaction among multiple entities, distributed time sensitive
decision making, and the criticality of consequences that may result from ill-informed
decision making. In some cases, operations have critical time interdependencies which
require significant planning and coordination to ensure the success of the mission
objectives. The timeliness of the information used in the decision making process
dramatically impacts the quality of command decisions. Hence, the documentation of
information dependencies is essential for the organization to gain a full appreciation of its
operational risks (Grimaila et al., 2009b; Grimaila et al., 2010). Information
dependencies encompass not only the information itself, but also all of the ICT systems
and devices used to store, process, transmit, or disseminate the information. Further, one
must understand how the information supports the organizational objectives and how the
information value changes as a function of time in relation to other mission activities.
While eliciting and documenting this information is not a trivial task, it is an essential
prerequisite for mission assurance so that mission risk management can be performed
(e.g., architect missions to be more resilient to cyber attacks prior to mission execution
and inform contingency decision making when the mission is underway) (Grimaila et al.,
2010).
Unfortunately, military organizations today struggle to maintain awareness of the
ICT systems they depend on for day-to-day operations. Several underlying problems
have been identified: 1) lack of dynamic risk assessment process, 2) lack of
documentation that explicitly identifies information assets and their mission value, 3)
lack of timely and relevant notification of downstream information consumers following
an information incident, and 4) poor to non-existent knowledge continuity (Grimaila et
2

al., 2009b). Most military organizations do not collect, document, maintain, refine,
disseminate, and exploit knowledge of mission-to-information dependencies effectively.
However, the ability to efficiently identify, quantify, document, and maintain a formal
understanding of mission-to-information resource risk is of paramount importance to
provide decision makers with actionable information needed to evaluate their mission
risk as a function of their ICT dependency. This insight is needed to proactively design
robust missions, develop and maintain situational awareness following an incident, take
appropriate contingency measures to assure mission success, and to retain and exploit the
“lessons learned” gained from experience (Grimaila et al., 2010; Hale et al., 2010).
1.2 Problem Statement and Purpose of Research
This research seeks to measure the utility of timely and relevant notification
following a cyber incident in a model operational setting. The underlying premise of the
research is that timely and relevant notification will enable appropriate contingency
actions to be taken sooner, improving operational outcomes and mission assurance. This
research is part of the Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) project
sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory which is focused upon improving the
timeliness and relevance of cyber incident notifications within the USAF through the
development of an incident notification Decision Support System (DSS). The objectives
of the research will be attained through human subject experimentation conducted in a
model hypothetical operational Air Force unit. This research seeks to objectively
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of cyber incident notifications both in the “as is”
case and in the presence of a proposed CIMIA incident notification process. In doing so,
3

the focus is upon understanding how information dependency knowledge can be used
following a cyber incident to improve incident response and decision making to assure
mission operations.
1.3 Hypothesis
The primary goal of the CIMIA project is to provide timely, accurate, secure, and
relevant notification from the instant an information incident is declared, until the cyber
incident is fully remediated (Grimaila et al., 2009a). There has been no quantitative
research that has been conducted to measure the effect of timely and relevant notification
for cyber incident response on mission objectives. The purpose of this experiment is to
remedy this deficiency by designing an experiment in a realistic mission environment that
will provide the empirical evidence necessary to test the main hypothesis. The main
hypothesis for this research was developed based on the notion that it is important to
promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a timely
manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their mission. The
null and alternate hypotheses are as follows:
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.

4

If there is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes, it is expected that the proposed CIMIA incident notification
process will result in a reduction in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents improving
mission assurance.
1.4 Research Goals
The primary goal of this research is to determine how the proposed CIMIA DSS
would impact mission objectives by evaluating its impact upon the time required to
identify a cyber incident and take appropriate contingency measures to assure the
organizational mission. This research goal complements other CIMIA research elements
focused upon identifying ideal candidate DSS technologies conducive for incident
notification (Woskov, 2011) and developing an incident notification architecture that
links together mission dependent entities (Miller, 2011). Lastly, this research seeks to
demonstrate the importance of explicit documentation identifying information resources
and their mission value. One result of this research would be to replace the manual effort
required to coordinate with the affected system owners and custodians to determine
which organizations are potentially affected by the incident. As a result, this research
effort can be operationalized by infusing a reliable DSS into the workplace, where
deemed appropriate. By doing so, organizations could potentially benefit from real-time
notification following an information incident. In addition to improved decision making,
the DSS may also provide knowledge continuity for mission owners.

5

1.5 Thesis Structure
This research is organized into five chapters with the first chapter providing the
introduction. Chapter 2 is a literature review of pertinent background information related
to this research. It then discusses the proposed CIMIA incident notification process, the
USAF incident notification process, and some key concepts that support the CIMIA
methodology. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the experiment of the study that is used
to determine that the value of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process within
military environments. Chapter 5 provides the conclusion of the research and offers areas
for future study in the research domain.

6

II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter acquaints the reader with several key concepts and issues pertaining
to the research. First, definitions and perspectives on situation awareness, decision
making and human performance are reviewed. Next, the current Air Force (AF) cyber
incident notification process and proposed alternative incident notification process,
CIMIA, are discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing the key concepts
that support the proposed CIMIA methodology.
2.2 Situation Awareness
The concept of Situational Awareness (SA) has its roots in the fields of air traffic
control, airplane cockpit control, military commands and control, and information
warfare. SA can be traced back to World War I, where it was recognized as a crucial
component for crews in military aircraft (Endsley 1996; Endsley & Jones, 1997, 2001;
Endsley & Garland 2000). Today, SA is one of the most prominent research topics in the
aviation Human Factors field; this interest grew in the mid-1980s and increased through
the 1990s partially through advancements in technology (Endsley & Garland, 2000). SA
can be achieved by people alone, while the human factors approach often requires the
integration of a specific technology, like automation. Although technology can be useful
to detect and report incident indictors or intuitions, Endsley argues that people are
frequently slow in detecting that a problem has occurred which necessitates human
intervention (1996). The author identified that additional time is spent figuring out the
7

situation and course of action, ultimately delaying human performance that can result in
slight delays to catastrophic failures with major consequences (Endsley, 1996).
While several limitations have been identified and discussed regarding problems
with automation and automation failures, (Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel & Wickens,
1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1979; Young, 1969; Endsley 1996) Endsley (1996) points out
that the use of automation can also be beneficial to achieving a higher level of SA with
several new approaches to automation. One daunting challenge is to keep the “human in
the loop” (Endsley, 1995). Endsley suggests one approach would be “to optimize the
assignment of control between the human and the automated system by keeping both
involved in the system operation” (1996). Furthermore, to reduce negative impact on the
operator’s SA (lower levels), a level of automation should be determined while keeping
the human actively involved in the decision making loop (Endsley, 1996).
According to Endsley, decision makers’ SA is a major factor driving the quality
of the decision process (1997). In other words, SA influences the decision making
process; it is “represented as the main precursor to decision making” (Endsley & Garland,
2000, p. 8). Although SA may mean many things to many people, simply put, SA is
being aware of what is going on in one’s surroundings, in the context of the individuals’
objectives. Endsley’s definition is widely recognized and defined as “the perception of
the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension
of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988,
p.97). The “elements” of SA “vary widely between domains, the nature of SA and the
mechanism used for achieving SA can be described generically” (Endsley, 2000, p.5).
SA is described as being dynamic, hard to maintain, and easy to lose. Although SA is a
8

challenging to maintain, it is central to good decision making and performance (Endsley,
2000). In cyberspace, decision makers face the challenge of maintaining a high level of
situational awareness to function in a timely and effective manner following a cyber
incident. SA in cyberspace is crucial to mission success to allow decision makers to
understand what matters. They must be able to continuously depend on critical ICT and
avoid working with tampered, corrupt, or missing information. Therefore, SA in
cyberspace must be maintained in order to ensure information dominance in cyberspace.
2.3 Maintaining Situation Awareness
A number of factors have been shown to influence the process of acquiring and
maintaining SA. Endsley describes three processes: perception, comprehension, and
projection (Endsley, 1995):
•

Level 1 SA - Perception of the elements in the environment

•

Level 2 SA – Comprehension of the current situation

•

Level 3 SA – Projections of future status

SA provides “primary basis of for subsequent decision making and performance in the
operation of complex, dynamic systems.” At the lowest level, perception is considered
fundamental to the process to reduce the odds of developing a model of a given situation;
“it involves perceiving critical factors in the environment” (Endsley, 1988, 1995). At
level 2 SA, a mental model is developed which are observations that correspond with
knowledge and experience: “understanding what those factors means, particularly when
integrated together in relation to the person’s goals (Endsley, 1988, 1995). In level 3 SA,
understanding from the previous level enables projections of a future state of the
9

environment: “an understanding of what will happen with the system in the near future”
(Endsley, 1988, 1995). Endsley (1998) reported that “these higher levels of SA are
critical for allowing a decision maker to function in a timely and effective manner” (p. 2).
SA is strongly related to the decision making process (Endsley, 2000). The
theoretical model of SA shows the relationship between SA and decision making (Figure
1). Endsley says that SA must precede decision making because the operator has to
perceive a situation in order to have a goal. Adams et al (1995) suggest an interrelationship between SA and the processes used to achieve that knowledge. Smith and
Hancock (1994) argue, but emphasize that “SA is up-to-the minute comprehension of the
task relevant information that enables appropriate decision making stress” (p. 3).

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Situation Awareness (adapted from Endsley & Garland,
2000)
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2.4 Cyber Attacks and Situational Awareness
A cyber attack that compromises the protection of information can have
catastrophic affects to mission objectives if the attack goes undetected, or the attack is
interpreted as business as usual (e.g. software glitches, computer crashes, ordinary
maintenance, frequent unavailability, etc.) which seems normal (Endsley & Jones, 2001).
Endsley (2001) proposed a model that “incorporates the ways in which information
attacks can effectively disrupt human decision making at various points in
information processing” (p.6) (Figure 2). By carefully examining not only the cues
that might depict an attack to information systems, but also how human observers
will be affected by such cues, one can develop more robust systems for protecting
against disruptions and information attack (Endsley & Jones, 2001). The model helps to
explain the effects that disruptions can have on SA and decision making in four major
categories: 1) disruptions that affect information pre-processing; 2) disruptions that
affect prioritization and attention; (3) disruptions that affect confidence in information,
and (4) disruptions that affect interpretation (Endsley & Jones, 2001). Although
disruptions can range from information overload to cyber attacks or malicious activity,
“the intention of the model is to help direct efforts at creating systems for supporting
decision makers in effectively comprehending and dealing with information attacks
and normal disruptions” (Endsley & Jones, 2001). Further, the author explains that the
model “is being used to develop decision support tools for detecting such attacks within
the context of normal disruptions and interruptions” (Endsley & Jones, 2001).
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Environment/System

Situation Awareness

Decision
Making

Perception Comprehension Projection

•
•
•
•

•
•

What is causing this event?
Is this a “normal situation”?
Is this a singular problem or is it
connected to other events
What impact will this have on
my facility and mission?

•
•

Action

How urgent is the problem?
Is this a new problem or part
of an already diagnosed
problem?
Do I need to take an action?
Do I need to gather more
information?

Figure 2. Decision Content for Detecting and Diagnosing Information Attacks (adapted
from Endsley, 2001)
2.5 Human performance and automation
Automation shifts human performance from a physical workload to a more
cognitive and perceptual activity which raises a host of human factor issues dealing with
situation awareness, vigilance, stress and workload (Endsley, 1996; Parasuraman, 1987;
Wickens & Carswell, 1997). There are several cases in which operators do not detect
critical state changes when acting as monitors of automated systems for a number of
reasons (Ephrath & Young; 1981; Kessel & Wickens, 1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1979;
Young 1969). Monitoring failures have occurred irregardless of the complexility level of
the tasks. According to Wickens and Carswell (1997), information processing lies at the
heart of human performance. As humans interact with systems, “the operator must
perceive information, transform that information into different forms, and take actions on
the basis of the percievd and transformed information” (p.90). Information processing
occurs in stages from perceptions in the environment to acting upon that envirnoment.
12

Wickens’ model (1992) in Figure 3 depicts the stages that develop in an operators
perception of the environment based on sensory processing to attend to, select, organize,
and interupt information in order to meaningfully recognize objects and events in the
environment. Wickens’ explains operators selectively focus on and attend to specific
stimuli that are most relevant to their goals or purpose (1992; Wickens and Carswell,
1997). Attendion initaties information processing and short-term/working memory.
Information which is attended to enters either short-term or working memory where
thinking occurs from external stimuli. Internal thought processes generate reason,
problem solve or make decisions to initate responses and actions. Decision making
requires the decision maker to make a choice between several alternatives.

Figure 3. A model of human information processing (adapted from Wickens, 1992)
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2.6 Human Decision Making
Decision making is a subset to the information processing that draws upon
sensory inputs. A paper by Lehto, “Decision making,” discusses that as decisions grow
more complex, information processing actually becomes part of decision making and
methods of decision support that help decision makers process information become of
growing importance (1997). Therefore, if automation is used to aid higher levels of SA
for decision makers to avoid undesirable consequences, the effects of automation support
must be carefully considered relative to information processing. The CIMIA incident
notification process is an alternative methodology to the incident notification process
utilized within the USAF to assist decision makers’ to maintain awareness of critical ICT
following a cyber incident.
2.7 CIMIA Incident Notification Process
The CIMIA project has proposed a different approach to deal with incident
notification following cyber incidents (Grimaila et al., 2009a). CIMIA proposes a
conceptual methodology for a defensive cyber damage and mission impact assessment to
provide decision makers situational awareness of the impact to mission capability
following a successful cyber incident; impact is a function of CIA (Fortson, 2007;
Fortson et al., 2007; Grimaila et al., 2007; Grimaila et al., 2008a; Grimaila et al., 2008b;
Grimaila et al., 2009a; Grimaila et al., 2009b; Grimaila et al., 2010; Hale et al., 2010).
Instead of a technology-based focus, an information asset-based focus is more conducive
to document mission-to-information dependencies. Organizations must employ a robust
14

risk management strategy that accounts for the mission, the information that is required
for mission success, and the ICT used in mission fulfillment in order to support risk
tradeoffs and contingency decision making. The use of a risk management process
allows decision makers to explicitly identify and document critical ICT systems
(Grimaila et al., 2009a; NIST, 2002; NIST, 2010; AFI-33-138, 2010). This is extremely
important when decision makers need an accurate assessment of how a cyber incident
impacts their mission.
By accomplishing a risk assessment, decision makers would achieve pre-incident
activities identified in the CIMIA incident notification process (Figure 4). These preincident activities deliberately identify and document all critical information processes
and assets that affect mission accomplishment for the organization. As Fortson (2007)
noted, this research advocates an asset-focused approach that takes into account the
information assets impact to the mission long before an incident occurs. According to
Grimaila et al. (2008b):
The identification and valuation of information dependencies must occur
before an incident occurs. Identification of an information dependency
inherently implies there is a supplier (source) of the information and a
consumer (sink) of the information. In some cases, both the information
supplier and consumer may be within the same organization, in others they
may be in different organizations. Regardless, each organization must first
identify, document, and value its information dependencies. This can be
accomplished through an information asset-focused risk assessment or
using other similar information asset profiling techniques. (NIST 2002;
Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, 2005).

15

Figure 4. Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Time (Fortson,
2007)
While the USAF notification process focuses on pushing cyber incident
notifications to all organizations in the Air Force Network Operations hierarchy, the
CIMIA incident notification process is focused on enabling downstream consumers to
discover and directly subscribe to the status of the mission critical ICT systems they
depend on to attain their mission objectives. In the proposed CIMIA incident notification
process, when an information incident occurs, the downstream consumers are notified in
near real-time that an event has occurred that may impact their missions as a consequence
of the loss, or potential loss of, information security (Grimaila et al., 2009a). The
notification will “supply meaningful mission impact assessment and enable accurate
16

predictive situational awareness, and develop a timely understanding of possible
adversarial intent during a cyber incident” (Grimaila et al., 2008b, p.9). Unfortunately,
the existing USAF cyber incident notification process does not provide the ability to
uniquely identify and notify decision makers who are critically dependent on the affected
ICT systems. Table 1 presents a comparison chart of the two incident notification
processes.
Table 1. Incident Notification Process Comparison Chart
Incident Notification
Process

Methodology

Timeliness

Relevance

Process

Means of communications

NOTAM (USAF)

Pop-up (CIMIA)

Pushes incident notifications
to all organizations in the
Air Force Network
Hierarchy

Enables downstream
consumers to discover and
directly subscribe to the status
of mission critical ICT
systems
Disseminates to downstream
consumers in near real-time
that an event occurred
Provides meaningful mission
impact and potential mission
impact to decision makers
following cyber incident
Focus upon information
stored, processed, and
transmitted within the
infrastructure
Cyber incident notification
disseminates via a mockup
pop-up

Disseminates to subordinate
organizations within 24
hours
Incident notification is
informative in nature;
primarily limited to
technical metrics
Focus upon the protection of
systems and network
infrastructure elements
C4 NOTAM disseminates
via email
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2.8 Current Cyber Incident Notification Process
When a cyber incident occurs, it is essential to notify decision makers whose
missions are affected in a timely and relevant manner to assure mission success. AFI 33138 explains the process used by Air Force Network Operations to generate, disseminate,
acknowledge, implement, track, and report network compliance end status information.
This document details the use of Time Compliance Network Orders for communicating
downward-directed operations, security and configuration management-related orders
issued by the Air Force Network Operations Security Center. Notification following a
cyber incident occurs using a Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
Notice to Airmen (C4 NOTAMs). C4 NOTAMs are informative in nature and are the
primary means for notifying organizations that a network incident has occurred which
may impact their mission operations. C4 NOTAMs are disseminated via email to
organizations required to be notified in accordance with AFI 33-138. The C4 NOTAM,
in Figure 5, is broadcast to all organizations identified as potentially affected by the
incident. As a consequence, some organizations may be notified who are not dependent
upon the affected ICT systems (Grimaila et al., 2009b). Worse, some organizations may
not be identified as dependent on the affected resource even though they are directly or
indirectly critically dependent upon the affected ICT systems. Thi1s situation prevents a
decision maker from acquiring a meaningful level of SA on the status of critical ICT.
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DATE: 13 JAN 2011
INTITAL RELEASE TIME: 13 0455Z JAN 11
TCNO TRACKING NUMBER: NOTAM C4-N AFNOC 2010-100-001
ORIGINATING AGENCY: 663 OC/CYCC
TYPE: INFORMATIVE
CATEGORY: NOTAM
PRIORITY: SERIOUS
SUBJECT: VULNERABILITY IN INTERNET EXPLORER COULD ALLOW REMOTE
CODE EXECUTION (981374)
MISSION IMPACT: LOSS OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY/INTEGRITY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
VULNERABILITY EXISTS IN MICROSOFT INTERNET EXPLORER THAT COULD
ALLOW A REMOTE ATTACKER TO RUN CODE OF THE ATTACKER’S CHOICE
OR PERFORM A DEINAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS) AGAINST A VULNERABLE
SYSTEM. MS INTERNET EXPLORER IS A WEB BROWSER FOR MICROSOFT
SYSTEMS.
SYSTEM(S) AFFECTED:
WINDOWS XP SP 2 AND WINDOWS XP SP 3
WINDOWS XP PROFESSIONAL X64 EDITION SP 2
WINDOWS SERVER 2003 SP 2
WINDOWS SERVER X64 EDITION SP 2
INTERNET EXPLORER 6 SP 1 FOR WINDOWS XP SP 2
INTERNET EXPLORER 7 FOR WINDOWS XP SP 2
INTERNET EXPLORER 7 IN WINDOWS VISTA, WINDOWS VISTA SP 1, WINDOWS
VISTA SP 1
ACTION:
PATCHES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. ORGANIZATIONS MAY APPLY
THE MS ADVISORY WORK AROUNDS TO TEMPORARILY ALLEVIATE THIS
PROBLEM. A TCNO WILL BE RELEASED ONCE MS ISSUES PATCHES FOR THIS
VULNERABILITY.
NOTE: ALL WORK AROUNDS WILL IMPACT OPERATIONS IN SOME WAY.
PLEASE READ THE WORK AROUNDS CAREFULLY.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH UNPATACHED SYSTEMS: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS
TO COMPROMISED SYSTEMS.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
NONE
REMARKS:
PLEASE CONTACT 663 CS HELP DESK - IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS AND/OR
CONCERNS AT 6503

Figure 5. C4 NOTAM
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Instead of utilizing email, the proposed CIMIA incident notification process is
disseminated via a pop-up to downstream consumers who subscribe and pull the status of
the critical ICT they depend on. Pop-ups are known to visually capture that attention of
an operator while using a computer. They are a form of an interruption that captures the
attention of an operator. Some research suggests that interruptions (e.g. warnings, alerts,
reminders, notifications, etc.) (Bailey et al., 2000) slows an operators’ performance on
interrupted tasks; however, some evidence exist that an interruption may actually speed
up the completion of a task (Zijlstra et al., 1999). Hence operators are affected by
interruptions in different ways. For this reason, it is important to identify key features
that may impact the effectiveness of the interruption. Fischoff et al. (1998) paper, “What
Information Belongs in a Warning?” suggests design of messages should focus on the
“critical gaps between what consumers know and what they need to know” (p. 664).
Because interruptions are typically viewed as communications whose purpose is to
inform and influence behavior, the mockup of the pop-up was based on Laughery and
Wogalter’s (1997) eight criteria for design and assessment of warnings. They are:
1) Attention – should be designed to attract attention;
2) Hazard information – should contain information about the nature of the hazard
3) Consequence information –should contain information about the potential
outcomes
4) Instructions – should instruct about appropriate and inappropriate behavior
5) Comprehension – should be understood by the target audience
6) Motivation – should motivate people to comply
7) Brevity – should be brief as possible
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8) Durability – should last and be available as long as needed (p. 1195)
In addition to this criterion, the challenge was to make the pop-up salient, attract the
operator’s attention, and to make the information seem relevant. Therefore, special
consideration was given to the size, color, signal words, and content of the pop-up shown
in Figure 6. The reminder of this Chapter discusses some of the key concepts that
support the CIMIA methodology.

Figure 6. CIMIA incident notification
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2.9 Information Security
The widespread use of information and communications technology (ICT) has
revolutionized the communication process and with it the significance and implications
of information security. Today, information has become more crucial than ever for
decision makers to maintain mission awareness. Decision makers depend on
information to meet their mission objectives; they make decisions based on the
information available at the time. Mission objectives cannot be achieved with erroneous
information. Clearly, information must be protected, but knowing what information to
protect is a challenge. Although information is a basis for decision making, all
information cannot be deemed critical. Because critical information is valuable,
organizations must recognize information security as a top priority and carefully consider
protecting critical information that supports mission objectives.
The Air Force uses security measures to protect and defend information and
information systems through both OPSEC and information assurance (Department of the
Air Force, 2002). Joint Publication (JP) 3-54, Operations Security, 1997, defines
OPSEC as a “process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a) indentify those
actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b) determine what
indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced
together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c) select
and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of
friendly actions to adversary exploitation” (1997, p.26). It explains that planning and
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execution occur as part of the commander’s command and control warfare efforts in
focusing on identifying and protecting critical information to increase mission
effectiveness (DoD, 1997). Information assurance, on the other hand, is defined as
“those measures to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring
their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation”
(Department of the Air Force, 1998, p.17). This definition is closely related to the
definition of information security, which is an event that appears to be a breach of the
organization’s information security countermeasures (i.e. systems that can prevent or
mitigate the effects of, threats to a computer, server, or network). In International
Organization for Standardization (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
Information Security Management 27000, information security is defined as the
“preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” (2009, p.3).
Information security is the process of protecting information. It is the protection of
information and ICT against unauthorized access or modification on information. “The
adverse impact of a security event can be described in terms of loss or degradation of any
or a combination of any, of the following three security goals: availability, integrity, and
confidentiality” (NIST, 2002, p.22). These three security goals, Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) are considered the core principles of information
security, and are commonly referred to as the CIA triad. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-37 rev 1, Appendix B
Glossary, defines CIA as:
•

Confidentiality – Preserving authorized restrictions on
information access and disclosure to prevent disclosure to
unauthorized individuals, entities or processes, including
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means of protecting personal privacy and propriety
information
•

Integrity – Guarding against improper information
modification or destruction and includes ensuring
information non-repudiation and authenticity

•

Availability – Ensuring timely and reliable access to and
use of information (2009)

Information can reasonably be called secure when confidentially, integrity, and
availability of information are present. Mutually, information security and information
assurance share the common goal of protecting the CIA of information. However,
“information assurance process is applied through technology-based activities”
(Department of the Air Force, 1998, p.17) while information security should be assetbased focused.
2.10 Information Asset
The CIA of information is critical to organizations’ missions. Therefore,
organizations cannot form protection strategies that are focused solely on infrastructure.
Instead, an information asset-based focus is more conductive to protecting critical
information that supports the mission. “Information should be the central focus in
understanding mission impact because it holds relevance and value as knowledge to
decision makers in the organization” (Grimaila et al., 2009a). An information asset is
“knowledge or data that has value to the organization” (ISO/IEC, 2009, p.3) or “any
information that has enterprise value and is created, managed, or accessed during the
operation of the organization” (AFPD 33-3, 2010, p.9). Having an information asset24

based focus allows organization to control risk with respect to protecting its information
assets. Achieving comprehensiveness in identification of assets is important because
perpetrators often look for assets and vulnerabilities that defenders have not recognized
(Parker, 2008). Hence, vulnerabilities in one area can have significant impact to related
mission interdependencies.
2.11 Criticality of Information
The value of any information is determined by the person using the information; it
does not necessary have to be the decision maker. AFI 31-401, Air Force Information
Security Program, advocates for protection of Air Force information by “delegating
authority to the lowest level possible” and “focusing on identifying and protecting only
that information that requires protection” (2005, p.7). Delegating authority down to the
lowest level places the responsibility of protecting information on the information
owners. According to the Committee for National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction
4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 2006, an information owner is an
“official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and
responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing,
dissemination, and disposal.” Along with many others, information owners must be
involved in this process to specify the criticality of information to ensure the appropriate
information security countermeasures (Pipken, 2008). The type and amount of protection
required depends on the nature of the information and its usage. As appropriate, the
protection of information varies between organizations; therefore, information owners
should determine what protection their information requires based on criticality. It is
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important for owners of information to inform those who access, use, and depend on their
information to understand the level of protection required, to implement appropriate
security countermeasures, and to recognize information incidents when they occur, in
order to take action. In addition, the determination of criticality is not solely based on the
information owner; instead, information consumers also must determine the criticality for
the ICTs on which they depend on.
According to AFI 33-129, Web Management and Internet Use, 2010, critical
information is “sensitive mission data that by itself is unclassified, but when combined
with other available data, may reveal classified information.” Information alone may not
seem important, but every little bit of information is a puzzle piece. In order to protect
mission-to-information dependencies, organizations must use a risk-based approach to
determine the consequences of having inadequate protection before an information
incident occurs. All ICT must include security controls that reflect the value of critical
information processed on the system. The DoD and the Air Forces have done a
commendable job in establishing directives, policies, procedures, and guidance for
protecting information. However, despite these efforts, ICT are far from being secure.
Protecting against an information incident even on a small scale is challenge for
organizations to accomplish.
Organization cannot reply on a small set of protective technologies to protect
critical ICT that support mission objectives. ICT are constantly at risk of cyber attacks
that compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability. An adversary would like
nothing more than to gain access to critical ICT on which decision makers depend to
maintain mission success. Therefore, organizations must employ a robust risk
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management strategy that accounts for the mission, the information that is required for
mission success, and the ICT used in mission fulfillment in order to support risk tradeoffs
and contingency decision making.
The scope of the problem with protecting critical information is identifying what
information to protect. Therefore, organizations must look at the information that
directly supports mission objectives to apply adequate protection countermeasures. This
can be achieved by using a systematic approach, including risk management principles, to
identify critical information and associated risks. Otherwise, the lack of awareness could
lead to information incidents that could compromise the mission. Although insufficient
resources exist to fully secure ICT, organizations can take steps to mitigate risks and
improve their current state.
2.12 Risk Management
No organization is immune to risk; in fact, risks are constantly changing, which
requires organizations to have a proper balance of control to achieve risk management.
An organization implements a risk management program to reduce negative impact on its
ability to perform the mission (NIST, 2010). The goal of the risk management process is
to help organizations manage their risks to an acceptable level. It is recognized as a tool
that organizations can use to protect invaluable critical information and better manage
ICT and their risks. “Risk management is the process that allows IT managers to balance
operational and economic cost of protective measure and achieve gains in mission
capability by protecting IT systems and data that support their organizations’ missions”
(NIST, 2002, p.4). Decision makers must make a commitment to understand and include
27

risk management in their decision making process to determine the extent of potential
threats and risks associated with IT systems (NIST, 2002). While this process is complex
and constantly changing, it must be an organization wide effort. The rapid growth in
technology and information sharing has increased the risk to critical information being
compromised. Obviously, if decision makers decide not to execute risk management
principles because the cost outweighs the gain, they are exposing the organization to risk.
Organizations use risk management to identify what risks the organization is exposed to
then decide which risks need immediate attention and which risks are acceptable.
There are several different definitions of risk. According to ISO/IEC 27000, risk
is the “combination of the probability of an event and its consequence” (p.4). NIST 80030, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, 2002, describes risk as
the net “negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, considering both the
probability and the impact of the occurrence” (p.1). Finally, risk is the likelihood that
something bad will happen that causes harm to an informational asset (or the loss of the
asset) (NIST, 2002). While there are many different meanings of risk, risk-related events
either have a positive or negative deviation from what is expected. Although
organizations should assess risk to determine the extent of potential threats and risks
associated with ICT, the process can be extremely labor intensive, time consuming, and
require periodic updates when mission objectives change.
2.13 Risk Assessment
While risk management processes are challenging, they are crucially important to
identify risks and determine optimal protection strategies. The implementation of risk
28

management in every organization is different. Organizations must develop strategies
that can be translated and tailored to their organizational mission. The risk assessment
process selected must provide an accurate assessment of the mission risk.

According to

DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy an Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 2010, risk
assessment is a “system examination of risk using discipline processes, methods, and
tools.” From this perspective, it is the necessary actions taken to prevent, remediate, or
mitigate the risks resulting from vulnerabilities. Conducting the assessment provides an
environment for decision makers to evaluate and prioritize risk continuously and to
recommend strategies to remediate or mitigate those risks (DoD, 2010). NIST 800-30
describes risk assessment as the first process in the management methodology. It is a
process that identifies risk, assesses risk and takes steps to reduce risk; it encompasses
identification and evaluation of risk and risk impacts, and recommendation of riskreducing measures. Using this approach produces a value for IT assets and resources
effect based on the potential mission impact (e.g. the criticality, and sensitivity of the IT
system components and data) (NIST, 2002). ISO 31000 recognizes that organizations
operate in an uncertain environment. Every decision made by a decision maker involves
some level of risk. It defines risk assessment as a process that is made up of three
processes:
•

risk identification, a process used to find, recognize, and
describe risk that could affect mission objectives;

•

risk analysis, a process that is used to understand the
nature, source, and causes of identified risk and estimate
level of risk; and

•

risk evaluation, a process used to compare analysis results
with risk criteria to determine whether or not a specific
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level of risk is acceptable or endurable to mission
objectives (ISO, 2009 p.18)
As information continues to become a critical asset in organizations, it must be
protected against various sources of unwanted access, external attacks, malicious
insiders, natural disaster, accidents and/or equipment failure and from within, or external
to, the organizational boundary (Grimaila et al., 2009a). All the information held within
organizational boundaries is subject to cyber attacks. Organizations must prepare for and
operate through cyber degradation or attack. A risk assessment can better prepare an
organization for an information incident. The quality of the assessment depends on the
accuracy of information collected in each step. NIST advocates for a risk assessment
methodology, discussed above, that incorporates nine primary steps (Figure 7). Although
the risk assessment process is extensive, at a minimum, organizations should complete
the first step, System Characterization, to manage risk. In the first step, an organization
can identify critical ICT resource dependencies, the downstream consumers on these ICT
resources, and the valuation of systems in terms of how they support mission objectives.
This information plays a vital role analyzing the impact of an information incident on the
organization’s mission. More specifically, when an information incident occurs, decision
makers at all levels whose missions are affected can be notified in a timely and relevant
manner to maintain awareness of their critical ICT resources and assure mission success.
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Figure 7. Risk Assessment Activities (NIST, 2002)
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2.14 Mission Assurance
As risks to ICT have steadily increased, the growing threat has led to increased
focus on mission assurance. According to mission assurance doctrine, mission assurance
consists of measures required to accomplish essential objectives of missions in a
contested environment, entails prioritizing mission essential functions (MEFs), mapping
mission dependence on cyberspace, identifying vulnerabilities, and mitigating risk of
known vulnerabilities (Department of the Air Force, 2010, p.7).

Mission assurance

ensures that organizations are able to provide assurance for those ICT on which they
depend to meet mission needs, even when compromised. When a mission has been
compromised, it does not have to result in mission failure; instead, the mission is
degraded to an acceptable level where operations can continue. Therefore, organizations
must constantly revisit their risk management strategies to ensure critical ICT that
support mission objectives are secure (Grimaila et al., 2010). Although organizations
cannot prevent every attack, they must be able to defeat an adversary when a cyber attack
occurs and sustain their missions. Mission assurance means ensuring that ICT can
support mission objectives in times of uncertainty: “a deficiency of information and leads
to inadequate or incomplete understanding” (ISO, 2009).
Today, organizations have a dependence on critical information embedded in IT
systems which can be exploited by an adversary as a weakness. Defending critical ICT
resources from an adversary is a serious challenge, especially with the use of
commercial-off-the-shelf products. “The proliferation of commercially available
technology will allow adversaries to develop niche capabilities that will threaten, in
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varying degrees, the successful conduct of operations in areas where the US forces were
previously unchallenged” (Department of the Air Force, 2010). Cyberspace operations
doctrine states that:
Adversaries in cyberspace are exploiting low-entry cost, widely available
resources, and minimal required technological investment to inflict serious
harm, resulting in an increasing complex and distributed environment.
They are fielding sophisticated cyberspace systems and experimenting
with advanced war-fighting concepts.
As sophisticated adversaries continue to exploit vulnerabilities of critical ICT resources
which organizations depend on for mission success, organizations must prioritize the
organization’s mission objectives, determine critical information assets that support these
objectives, and come up with a plan for mitigating cyber threats to critical ICT resources.
In 2008, the DoD Inspector General published an audit of 436 DoD mission critical IT
systems and found:
•

264 system (61 percent) lacked a contingency plan or their owners
could not provide evidence of a plan

•

358 systems (82 percent) had a contingency plan that had not been
tested or for which their owners could not provide evidence of
testing

The audit concluded that “DoD mission-critical systems may not be able to sustain warfighter operations during disruptive or catastrophic event” (DoD, 2008). Ensuring
organizations can accomplish the mission while in degraded information environment
requires a wide range of protection measures. Finally, these protection measures must be
coordinated within and across organizational boundaries where interdependencies are
inherently created by reliance on critical information to support mission objectives.
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2.15 Summary
This chapter summarized the literature that is necessary to understand and
conduct the research presented in this thesis. Recognizing that humans interact with
systems in their own way and information processing occurs in stages that draws upon
sensory inputs, Figure 8 shows the research model that will be used to compare the
existing USAF incident notification process which uses incident notification
dissemination via email, with the proposed CIMIA incident notification process which
achieves incident dissemination via pop-up notices.

Figure 8. Research Model
The purpose of this model is to provide the empirical evidence necessary to test
the main hypothesis identified in this research that it is important to promptly notify
decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a timely manner so they
can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their mission. It is upon this
model that the experiment methodology in Chapter 3 is based.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the hypothetical real-world environment
in which the research experiment is conducted, explain the experiment design, and
discusses the statistical methods that were used to analyze the collected data.
3.2 Research Objective
No quantitative research exists to measure the effect of timely and relevant
notification for cyber incident response on mission objectives. The purpose of this
experiment is to remedy this deficiency by designing an experiment in a realistic mission
environment that will provide the empirical evidence necessary to test the main
hypothesis. The null and alternate hypotheses are as follows:
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
The main hypothesis for this research was developed on the notion that it is important
to promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a
timely manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their
mission.
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3.3 Experimental Environment Description
Research personnel comprised of both military and civilian personnel met
regularly over a six month period to consider a potential environment to evaluate the
utility of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process. The first discussions
centered on the nature of potential experiments, and what needed to be done to ensure
that the experiment was not biased. The initial task was to ensure that the experimental
results would provide the necessary data to test the given hypothesis. During
brainstorming sessions, a variety of different experiments were considered to test the
hypothesis. Several meetings were held to consider the best operational environment that
had critical mission-to-information dependencies and could be easily abstracted so that
test subjects could be drawn from the general population. The outcome of these meetings
helped shape the experimental environment and resulted in the selection of the
Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) as the experimental environment in which to
conduct the research.
The realization that it will be difficult to model and simulate the full extent of the
MOC environment led to the design tradeoffs to identify and select only a subset of the
MOC tasks for use in the experiment. The aspects used in this experiment are only
superficially accurate; the operational environment is not accurate in great detail.
However, the concept of the scenario is based on the organizational setting and aspects of
the real-world operational environment. Adelman suggests that the more accurate the
simulation along all dimensions, the greater the external validity of the experiment
(1991). Accurate representation of the operational environment is particularly important
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for future experiments as the CIMIA incident notification process is fully developed
(Adelman, 1991). The experiment focused on information incidents that involved an
internal server, and two external databases that are representative of the systems used in
the MOC along with several aspects of the operational environment.
The research personnel focused on developing the appropriate case study based
on the information obtain from the MOC to exploit critical mission-to-information
dependencies. Yin has defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; using multiple sources of
evidence; and striving to explain how or why something happened by logically linking
the data to the propositions supporting one rival hypothesis versus others” (1984, p. 23).
Using this definition, the case study measured the proposed CIMIA incident notification
process by demonstrating the feasibility for developing an incident notification process to
improve the USAF’s incident notification process. Adelman argues that developers of
decision support systems (DSS) lack the empirical data supporting the merits of their
system (1991). Therefore, to evaluate whether the CIMIA incident notification process
improves the push method utilized in the USAF, the research personnel created a
hypothetical scenario to generalize some aspects of the MOC’s operational environment.
The MOC operates under the maintenance group; it is considered the eyes and
ears of the maintenance group commander. The MOC operates around-the-clock, and is
continuously dependent on information and communications technologies (ICT)
throughout day-to-day operations to exchange information between numerous units. To
do this, MOC personnel work day, swing, and mid shifts where they plan, schedule, and
manage actions for assigned aircraft. This information-rich environment must maintain
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awareness of competing resources based on daily flying schedules and maintenance
priorities (AFI 21-101, 2010; AF1 21-102, 2010; AFI 21-103, 2010). MOC personnel are
responsible for maintaining aircraft readiness per AFI 21-101; they “monitor and
coordinate sortie production, maintenance production, and execution of the flying and
maintenance schedules” (p.114). Aircraft maintenance data collection and
documentation are tracked in the Maintenance Management Information System (GO81)
(AFI 21-101, 2010). This system is highly integrated with a global system called Global
Decision Support System (GDSS). Both systems push and/or pull information, and are
not totally reliant on each other. Either system is capable of maintaining aircraft
maintenance data separately if needed should one become unavailable. For instance,
GO81 may push/pull aircraft discrepancies and aircraft status to GDSS while GDSS
pushes/pulls missions, launch, and landing times to GO81. GDSS is primary utilized to
check aircraft availability, discrepancies, and monitor the status of the USAF’s fleet of
aircraft. Higher levels of command utilize this system for status conditions that affect
aircrafts ability to perform assigned missions.
The MOC ensures that the information is accurately entered into the GO81 in a
timely manner so higher levels of command can determine aircraft availability for
mission tasking (AFI 21-101, 2010). If information is not accurately updated in a timely
manner, it could impair the military mission. Real-time data updates help reduce ground
times and improve management of base support functions. It is apparent that the MOC’s
mission depends on information that is accurate to conduct operations. To obtain a better
understanding, research personnel had the opportunity to visit a MOC. With the support
of the MOC’s superintendent, military personnel were interviewed and provided
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substantial input on the most critical aspects of their operations. This input was used to
develop a case study providing a framework for evaluating the proposed CIMIA incident
notification process. Based on these findings, two mission objectives were used to
develop an experiment: 1) ensure aircraft status is reported accurately, and 2) ensure all
GO81 information is entered accurately and timely.
Focusing on an information incident, research personnel examined how the MOC
dealt with the loss of CIA. Surprisingly, the MOC had excellent contingency measures to
deal with the loss of availability. The MOC is not solely dependent on the GO81; in
contrast, documentation is maintained in parallel to system entries for unanticipated
availability. Having the appropriate contingency measures in place when the loss of
availability occurred would not result in mission failure or severe degradation. Instead,
when GO81 was not availability, the MOC documented maintenance information in a log
book and/or phoned another unit with GDSS access to update the system to ensure
information was accurately reported. MOC personnel are used to experiencing the loss
of availability, but had no knowledge of the loss of either integrity or confidentially.
However, the mission’s impact was discussed if loss of integrity or loss of confidentially
occurred. Consequently, the loss of either CIA would have some impact on the MOC’s
mission objectives. Based on this situation, a simple experimental scenario was created
in which the methods of both cyber incident notifications processes could be evaluated.
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3.4 Equipment and Facility
The experiment was conducted in a room at the Air Force Institute of Technology
on Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The room was configured to resemble the operational
environment of a MOC, as shown in Figure 9.
A small local area network (LAN) was configured for the experiment using a
router. The LAN consisted of two Hp Compaq dc5858 Microtowers with 3.48 Gbytes of
RAM and 2.69 GHz of hard disk drive. Each microtower ran independently with
Windows XP operating system. The first microtower was used as the workstation for
subjects. The workstation included two 20-inch monitors, one Video Graphics Array
(VGA) and one Digital Visual Interface (DVI) connection. The subject’s workstation
hosted email and a graphical interface (GUI) for the database. The second microtower
was used as a server for the Domain Name System (DNS), email server, and host system
for two databases. Two 30-inch monitors were connected, one VGA and DVI
connection.
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Figure 9. Experimental Environment
3.5 Software Description and Procedures
Oracle Database 10g Express Edition for Windows was the database of choice
because it was free to develop, easy to deploy and distribute, and fast to download.

This

platform is well documented and has many accessible books, forums, blogs, and articles
for troubleshooting problems. The first database developed was GO81. The MOC
utilizes GO81 to document aircraft information and exercise related missions to ensure
100 percent reporting accuracy on aircraft mission capability (AFI 21-101, 2010). The
development of the GO81 database focused only on maintenance aspects of timely and
accurate reporting within the assigned aircraft function of the system. As shown in
Figure 10, sixteen fields were selected for the case study scenario to provide relevant
information about the aircraft’s current mission capability. The second database, GDSS,
was designed with the same look and feel of the GO81.
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Figure 10. Maintenance Management Information System (GO81)
Headquarters Air Mobility Command utilizes GDSS to have visibility of available
resources to meet mission requirements. Communication interfaces between GO81 and
GDSS allows the exchange of real-time data updates on aircraft status conditions. The
design of the GDSS database is similar to the actual system utilized in the Air Force.
However, only a portion of the information about aircraft owned by the hypothetical
airlift wing was utilized in the experiment.
Information contained in the aircraft summary display on GDSS was obtained
from the GO81 Maintenance Management Information System through user-entered data.
In the experiment, GO81 pushes updates to GDSS 2 within minutes the information has
been entered into the database. Each database has a total of 16 fields, of which only 12
are the same between the two systems. The aircraft summary displays provide visibility
to monitor aircraft resources. The displays for GO81 and GDSS reflect aircraft owned by

42

the hypothetical airlift wing regardless of the aircraft’s location. A description of the
fields in both databases is provided in Appendix D.
A GUI was developed using NetBeans Integrated Development Environment
(IDE) 6.9.1. This free open source IDE provided a JavaFX Composer tool to create and
layout a GUI to interact with the GO81.
The email agent used to manage email during the experiment was Mozilla
Thunderbird, a free open source email client, was installed on the subject’s workstation.
The email server hMailServer, a free email server for Microsoft Window that supports
POP3 email protocol, was installed on the server workstation. The server workstation
also hosted the DNS server which was Dual DHCP Server 6.72.
3.6 Experimental Scenario
A military scenario was developed that described the mission to be accomplished
and the tasks that were expected to be performed. The 663rd Airlift Wing, a fictitious
organization, at Rickenbacker AFB in Columbus, Ohio, was the operational environment
for the scenario. The subjects were presented a power point presentation which provided
background information about the wing’s mission and how the MOC helps the wing as a
whole by ensuring the mission is accomplished. The presentation provides the in
information in the mission brief script shown in Figure 11.
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663rd Mission Brief Script
The 663 AW supports a worldwide global mobility mission to provide trained
maintenance specialist for the U.S Air Force’s largest cargo transport aircraft, the C-5 Galaxy
and C-17 Globalmaster III cargo aircraft. These aircraft move valuable supplies and people
in support of Global Reach for America. The 663rd Maintenance Squadron Maintenance
Operations Center (MOC), under the direction of the maintenance group commander,
manages scheduled maintenance to the fleet on a near 24/7 basis to accomplish all operational
commitments with minimal impact to maintenance personnel, facilities and equipment while
ensuring optimal use of both time and resources. They coordinate and control scheduled and
unscheduled aircraft maintenance to ensure readiness for 18 assigned aircraft. As the MOC
coordinates maintenance operations, they ensure timely and accurate support of everyday and
exercise related missions, implementing daily flying and maintenance schedules to ensure
optimum utilization of hundreds of maintenance group personnel. The more than 400
members of the squadron streamline their technical expertise in supporting C-5 and C-17
aircraft. Their mission is to provide global response, world-class systems, support equipment,
and aircraft maintenance. All team members of the 663rd Maintenance Squadron play a
pivotal role in maintaining aircraft and equipment in mission-ready status to ensure
Headquarters Air Mobility Command’s ability to maintain Global Reach for America.

Figure 11. 663rd Mission Brief Script
Once the subjects understood the wing’s mission, they were told what tasks were
expected of them. Each subject in the experiment assumed the role of a Shift Supervisor
on swing shift who was responsible for ensuring Rickenbacker’s fleet of aircraft was
maintained. In this role, the subjects were instructed to keep track of every assigned
aircraft and the aircraft’s current mission capability. They ensured timely and accurate
support of everyday and exercise related missions while managing computer-based
platforms to include GDSS and GO81. They were tasked with the crucial responsibility
of flawless orchestration of maintenance operations which ensures timely and accurate
support to Headquarters Air Mobility Command. Figure 12 shows the experiment
scenario that each subject was briefed.
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Experiment Scenario Script
You have just reported to the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) for swing duty.
The day-shift Shift Supervisor has just briefed you on the daily events and gives you a
backlog of updates to enter into GO81. The database was unavailable part of the day for
scheduled maintenance. As a result, several updates need to be entered into the database for
accurate status reporting on the 663rd fleet of aircraft. The scheduled system maintenance on
GO81 was advertised in advanced and all system users are aware that the system is back
online. Your objectives in this study are to accurately enter all data from the data sheets into
GO81 and ensure the information is accurately pushed to GDSS, monitor email, listen for and
write down radio communications and answer any calls that come into the MOC based on
your understanding of the mission.

Figure 12. Experimental Scenario Script
Each task was described and subjects received training to ensure they understood
their role in the experiment. The training provided is discussed below under the preexperimental activities.
3.7 Experimental Design
The experimental design approach focused on the selection of the appropriate case
study to represent the different treatment conditions. According to Keppel, “an
experiment consists of a carefully work-out and executed plan for the data collection and
analysis. Treatment conditions are chosen to focus on particular features of the testing
experiment” (1982, p. 4). Furthermore, he explains that “conditions are administrated to
subjects in such a way that observed differences in behavior can be unambiguously
attributed to critical differences existing among the various treatment conditions”
(Keppel, 1982, p. 4).
This experiment was tailored from factorial experimentation which “permits the
manipulation of more than one independent treatment in the same experiment” (Keppel,
45

1982, p.20). Specifically, a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with a combination of withinsubjects and between-subjects variables was used. The term “mixed” refers to the
elements of both within-subject and between-subject designs (Keppel, 1982). This
design uses the same subjects with every condition of the research, including the control.
Keppel explains that subjects serve more than once in the experiment, repeated
measurements are taken, and treatment effects are associated with differences observed
within each subject.
In the 2x2 Mixed Factorial Design shown in Table 2, the design consists of one
within-subject variable (type of incident notification), with two levels (NOTAM and Popup), and one between-subjects variable (incident notification order), with two levels
(NOTAM/Pop-up and Pop-up/NOTAM).
Table 2. 2x2 Mixed Factorial Design
Factor C
Type of Incident Notification
Factor A
Initial Notification
NOTAM

S1
S8
S11
S18

Factor B
Subjects
S2 S3
S9 S10
S16 S17
S19 S24 S25

Pop-up

S4
S7
S14
S21

S5 S6
S12 S13
S15 S20
S22 S23

Session 1

Session 2

NOTAM

Pop-up

Pop-up

NOTAM

In this case, the USAF incident notification process (NOTAM) was one of two
independent variables, compared to the proposed CIMIA incident notification process
(Pop-up) being the second independent variable.
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Subjects who participated in the experiment received random assignment to the
between-subject variable. This procedure guaranteed that the treatment condition had an
equal opportunity of being assigned to a given subject and whatever other uncontrolled
factors might be present during any testing (Keppel, 1982). “The critical features of
random assignment, then, are that each subject-session combination is equally likely to be
assigned to any one of the treatment and that the assignment of each subject is
independent of that of the others” (Keppel, 1982, p.16).
3.8 Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted approximately four weeks before the first
experiment. The pilot study was performed with 20 volunteer Air Force Institute of
Technology graduate students at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton OH. Because
experiments involving humans are difficult to design and control, the pilot study was
used to establish which variables could be controlled and measured, and to reveal any
deficiencies in the design of the proposed experiment. Patten states that pilot studies are
designed to obtain preliminary information on how new treatments and instruments work
(2009). That is to say, they can potentially reveal errors in design as well as allow for
refinement and correction before the actual experiment. Specifically, the pilot study was
used to check experimental procedures, operation of equipment to include hardware and
software (GO81 and GDSS), data collection techniques, and the questionnaire.
The pilot study gave the researcher the opportunity to practice and receive notable
remarks from the pilot group. The lessons learned in the pilot study were weaknesses in
the experimental procedures related to training and clarification issues in the
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questionnaire. The pilot study group received a training session that included all the
expected tasks to be performed. The training session was not originally divided into
sessions to allow practice and complete understanding before receiving instruction on the
next task. Modifications to the experimental procedures resulted in the subjects receiving
training in stages to allow for practice after instruction on each task.
The most notable remarks received from the pilot group referred to the
questionnaire. Originally, the questionnaire asked open-ended questions. Many of the
responses received did not answer the intended question and several subjects asked for
clarification before responding. As a result, several questions were modified to improve
clarity and the open-ended questions were changed to an 8-point Likert scale response.
3.9 Subjects
The subjects used in this experiment were drawn from the graduate student
population at the Air Force Institute of Technology and undergraduate student population
at Wright State University located in Dayton, Ohio. Participation was completely
voluntary.
3.10 Experiment Procedures
Prior to their arrival, the subject’s were randomly assigned a subject number
which determined the experimental design block for the experiment, as shown in Figure
9. Subjects did not know in advance about the experimentation process, nor did they
have any prior knowledge of what was expected of them. They were told that the
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purpose of the experiment was to evaluate a prototype software tool investigating an Air
Force program in a simulated real-world situation.
3.10.1 Pre-experimental Activities
The first pre-experimental activity was the administration of the consent form.
The consent form was reviewed in detail to ensure each subject understood. Next, the
experiment scenario was conveyed and a short presentation (mission brief discussed
above) was presented which provided background information about the scenario.
Another pre-experimental task explained the experimental environment. Subjects
received training on the tasks they were expected to perform. The training was
segmented into stages that explained each task to be performed. This allowed subjects
the opportunity to practice what was instructed immediately which prevented them from
receiving too much information at once. In the first portion of training, they were
introduced to GO81.
Operation of the GO81 database for subjects was relatively straightforward. The
subjects needed to understand how to bring up the data entry screen, enter data from a
data sheet (Appendix F), and change data. These topics were fully addressed and
discussed during a “hands-on” training session. After specific instruction, the subjects
spent eight minutes in a training session to become familiarized with the data sheets and
data entry screen. They were instructed to locate every field between the data sheet and
data entry screen, and verify the information on the entry screen was correct before
saving the information in GO81. In order to enter data into GO81, the subject had to
select the aircraft tail number (from data sheet) that required an update. This was
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accomplished by clicking on any part of the row with the aircraft’s tail number. Once
clicked, the data entry screen would pop-up for that tail number. After the subject
entered all the data from the data sheet into the entry form and clicked save, the
information was immediately saved in GO81. Within two minutes, the information was
pushed to GDSS 2. Once the subject was comfortable with the task, the second training
stage instructed was how to verify information between GO81 and GDSS.
The process of verifying information between the two systems was simple. The
two 30-inch monitors connected to the server displayed GO81 and GDSS respectively.
The subjects were instructed to visibly compare the information in GO81 and GDSS. By
looking at the row of the tail number in GO81 and the same tail number in GDSS, the
subject could verify that the information was accurately pushed from GO81 to GDSS.
This portion of the training session was intended to familiarize the subjects with the
common fields between the databases and verify the information they previously entered
was accurate in GDSS. The next training stage was instruction on how to use email.
The subjects received instruction on how to use the basic functions of Mozilla
Thunderbird email client. These functions included how to open, send, delete and read
email. The last training stage included the use and operation of the telephone and radio.
The operation of the telephone and radio were both straightforward. Telephone
instructions were given and a list of frequently called numbers was available on speed
dial. The radio was simulated through the desktop speakers for one-way transmission.
The subjects did not have to interact with the radio; they were instructed to listen for and
write down all radio transmissions. All transmissions were broadcast twice. If the
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transmission was unclear or not recorded in a timely manner, the subjects were asked to
write the time of the broadcast.
Finally, subjects received detailed instruction on how to complete the NASA
workload assessment. They were given the opportunity to practice and ask any questions
on how to complete the assessment.
In addition, the subjects received a continuity binder (Appendix D) that included
information covered in the training session. The continuity binder also included a graph
of all the ICT that the subjects depended on during the experiment. Each of the tasks was
accomplished with one of the available resources.
3.10.2 Experimental Session
The subject’s objectives were to complete all given updates from a datasheet into
GO81, monitor email, listen for and write down radio transmissions, and answer any calls
that came into the simulated MOC environment. Subjects were asked to input the
information from the datasheets into GO81 and verify that the information was
successfully updated. The subjects had to actively monitor the accuracy of GO81 and,
within two minutes, ensure the same information was updated and reflected accurately in
GDSS. Some information that subjects entered was manipulated, changed or altered, and
made unavailable as part of the experiment. The subjects experienced three types of
information loss or modification by manipulation, representing losses of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA). These manipulations took the form of notices directly to
the subject from the two incident notification platforms. The USAF incident notification
process utilized a push method process in the form of an email. The CIMIA incident
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notification process utilized a subscribe and pull process (discussed in Chapter 2) in the
form of a pop-up notification following a cyber incident.
The experiment was divided into two sessions in which subjects were required to
complete the same set of tasks. Each session of the experiment included the three types
of manipulation. To induce cyber attacks that resulted in the loss of integrity and loss of
availability, incorrect information was deliberately presented, information between the
two systems was deliberately mismatched, and/or either system was made unavailable.
The loss of confidentiality resulted in a breach to the intranet web server by an adversary.
The server contained a weekly flying schedule. The subjects were not informed that
some of the information they updated in the database was manipulated, altered, and not
available as part of the experiment. At the conclusion of the experiment, the true intent
of the experiment was debriefed to all subjects.
Once the experiment started, the subjects were presented with the three types of
manipulation in each session based on their progress of completing the datasheets.
Additionally, each subject was presented distracting information in the form of emails,
radio updates, and calls that had to be acknowledged and, in some cases, required a
course of action. The manipulations and distractions were applied in the same sequence
and at approximately the same time during each session as shown in Figures 13 and 14.
In each session, subjects were given 30 minutes to complete all given tasks.
Immediately following the first session of the experiment, subjects completed a rating
(NASA TLX) workload assessment. Upon completion, subjects were given a 10-15
break before starting the next session. In the second session, subjects were asked to
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complete the same tasks followed by two additional workload assessments, one rating
and weights.

Cyber Incident timeline by data sheet
Start

0

1

Cyber incident

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11
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13

Cyber incident

14

15

Cyber incident

Figure 13. Cyber Incident timeline by data sheet

Distractions timeline by minutes
Start

Radio update

Radio update

Experiment Ends
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Email
Email
Email Email
Email
NOTAM

NOTAM

Figure 14. Distractions timeline by minutes
3.10.3 Post-experimental Activities
At the completion of the experiment all subjects completed a questionnaire
identical to that shown in Appendix B. The post-experimental questionnaire was
administered to garner information in the following areas:
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(1) Gather some demographics of the subjects in terms of age, gender,
academic level
(2) Subjects self-assessment evaluation of their performance
(3) Evaluation of the incident notifications usefulness
(4) Indirect measures of situational awareness
Subjects were debriefed and their questions about the experiment were answered.
The experiment concluded when the questionnaire was completed and the subject’s
questions were answered. In total, each experimental session required approximately 2
hours per subject.
3.11 Questionnaire Design
This research sought to not only objectively measure the temporal aspect of an
cyber incident notification required for mission personnel to recognize and respond, but
also to measure through more subjective means the perceptions of the subjects, selfassessment. According to Endsley, the most commonly used means of subjectively
evaluating operator’s concepts on SA involves direct questioning. Thus, “the
measurement of SA provides a useful index for evaluation system design and training
techniques and for better understanding human cognition” (Endsley & Garland, 2000, p.
24). In addition,
One of the chief reasons for measuring SA has been for the purpose of
evaluating new system and interface design in order to determine the
degree to which new technology or design concepts actually improve or
degrade operator SA, it is necessary to systematically evaluate them based
on a measure of SA, thus providing determination of which ideas have
merit and which have unforeseen negative consequences.
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The questionnaire was employed to establish the subjects perception of critical aspects of
environmental elements in the experiment to determine their level of SA and to perform
comparative analysis of responses associated with each session. The intent was to use an
ordinal scale similar to the Likert 7-point scale. Although the Likert scale is commonly
understood and well known, the survey instrument used is not a validated measuring
device for SA or DSS. Instead of the traditional 7-point Likert scale, an 8-point scale was
used for ease of analysis. The development phase of the questionnaire was extracted
from guidance in the U.S Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences’ Questionnaire Construction Manual and the human factors and ergonomics
field of study on questionnaires.
In addition to the ordinal scale questions, multiple choice questions were also
administered in the questionnaire. These questions were administrated to obtain a single
answer response for demographic information such as gender, age group and academic
level and multiple answer selections.
3.12 Data Collection Techniques
During each session of the experiment three log files were used to record time
stamps of the events that occurred. The first log file recorded the data entered in GO81.
This log provided the time stamp of every data sheet entered, as well as what data was
entered and shared between the two databases. It also provided the start and end of the
experiment for each subject. The researcher used this information to measure part of the
subject’s performance outcome that included the number of sheets completed during each

55

session of the experiment, accuracy of the information entered by the subject, and to
ensure the order of the sheets entered were consistent among subjects.
The second log was an automated telephone file log. This log provided the time
stamp of each call placed and destination of the call. The researcher used this information
to record the response time. The response time was calculated from the time the cyber
incident occurred (which was a predefined time previously discussed in Figure 13) to the
time the subject took a course of action.
The last log was a two-part evaluation file that contained the results of the NASA
TLX workload assessment. The NASA TLX workload assessment is a subjective
technique that relies on a multidimensional construct to derive an overall workload score
based on weight averages of ratings on six subscales: mental demand, physical demand,
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level. Slick et al. (2005) comment
that:
As defined, workload is task-dependent, because it generally refers to some part
of the relationship between an operator and the task being performed. There three are
key issues associated with measuring workload: First, workload is subjective in the sense
that individuals may use different criteria to judge their own workload, so there is no way
to compare subjective workload across individuals. Second, individuals’ criteria for
judging workload may change over time, as the individual becomes more proficient at the
primary task. Third, given that workload is subjective, there is no way to assess whether
individuals’ subjective ratings include all pertinent aspects of the task.
The NASA TLX consists of two-parts: ratings and weights. Ratings for each of
the six subscales are obtained from the subjects following the completion of each session.
A numerical rating ranging from 0 to 100 is assigned to each scale. Weights are
determined by the subjects’ choices of pairwise comparisons between all possible
combinations of the subscales, approximately 15. Weights are collected at completion of
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session 2. The ratings and weights are then combined to calculate a weighted average for
an overall workload score. The workload assessment was used to assess the subjective
ratings of workload between the presents and absence of the treatment. The first part of
the file provides the subjects individual ratings of session 1 and 2 respectively. Part two
of the file provided the weights evaluation that pertained to the workload experience of
the subject during both sessions of the experiment.
The data collection processes was standardized across all subjects by
implementing a Data Collection Form (Appendix E). The form was used to record the
logged information discussed above. In addition, the form was used to record observed
behavior that contributed to the subject’s decision making activities.
The questionnaire asked specific questions that related to the decision making
process of the subjects, as well as pointed questions that dealt with the conditions. For
this reason, a pre-process questionnaire was not used. The researcher did not what to
sensitize the subjects to the treatment. This problem is what Patten refers to as pretest
sensitization (2009). The pretest sometimes causes problems by exposing subjects to
what would be covered in the experiment (2009). To overcome this problem, only a
post-process questionnaire was used.
3.13 Statistical Analysis
According to Keppel, one of the important tasks in summarizing the outcome of
the experiment is by means of statistical indices and procedures (1982). Keppel suggests
that the goal is to extract as much meaningful information as possible from the
experiment. Although several statistical techniques were utilized in this study, one
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method used for evaluating the primary outcome examined the distribution of the data to
determine whether these distributions were significantly different. For instance, should
data from the CIMIA incident notification process result in a significantly different
distribution compared to the USAF’s incident notification process, one would conclude
that the treatment had a significant effect on the outcome variable being evaluated.
Based on the results of the sample statistical test, one could then make inferences about
the feasibility of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process being utilized within
the USAF. Hypothesis testing was used to determine the results of the data collected.
A hypothesis is a “prediction of the outcome of a study” (Patten, 2009, p. 15). It
asserts that the treatment will generate some type of effect. In this study, a null
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are considered for hypothesis testing. According to
Keppel, the research hypothesis is “translated into a set of statistical hypothesis, which
are then evaluated in light of the obtained data” (1982, p.24). He explains that the
statistical hypothesis “consists of a set of precise hypothesis about the parameters of the
different treatment populations.” The null and alternative hypotheses are two examples
of the statistical hypothesis which “are mutually exclusive or incompatible statements
about the treatment parameters” (Keppel, 1982, p.24). The hypothesis statement is the
null hypothesis, H o , which will be tested and rejected as false. The alternative
hypothesis, H a , will in turn be accepted as true when the H o is rejected (Keppel, 1982).
Comparing the difference between means to the variability within contestant distribution
is the basis for analysis of variance.
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3.14 Test Selection
An analysis of variance, abbreviated as ANOVA, is a method for hypothesis
testing that compares differences between two or more means to determine if the
averages are likely to be the same, or likely to be different. An ANOVA is an analysis of
the variation present in an experiment. It is a test of the hypothesis that the variation in
an experiment is no greater than that due to the normal variation of individuals’
characteristics and error in their measurement (Keppel, 1980). Keppel (1982) discusses
that the tests in an ANOVA are based on the F-ratio which is the variation due to an
experimental treatment or effect divided by the variation due to experimental error.
ANOVA is considered a parametric test which is “one that requires data from one of the
larger catalogue of distributions that statisticians have described and for data to be
parametric certain assumptions must be true” (Field, 2005, p. 63). The major
assumptions of ANOVA are:
•

Normally distributed

•

Homogeneity of variance

•

Independence

Keppel argues that violating the normality of distribution, homogeneity of
variance and independence of score in treatment conditions does not appear to have any
practical significance for statistical analysis of an experiment because they apply equally
to the factorial design. However, when data is not normal, remedial measures for nonnormality is data transformation which is applied so that the data appear to more closely
meet the assumptions of a statistical inference procedure (Field, 2005). Homogeneity of
59

variance is that the variance of the populations is equal. “ANOVA works well even this
assumption is violated except in the case where there are unequal numbers of subjects in
the various groups” (Fields, 2005, p.97). Violations of independence produce a nonnormal distribution, which results in invalid F ratios. However, independence
assumption is met through the random assignment of subject to conditions (Keppel,
1980).
3.15 Summary
This chapter presented the research methodology for this study. The conceptual
framework was defined and the research objective, case study and experimental design
were summarized. The data collection procedure and data analysis methods were also
discussed. Finally, this chapter concluded with the test selection used in the experiment
to be analyzed in the following chapter.
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IV. Results
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified the methodology for the collection and analysis of
data in order to test the hypothesis stated in chapter 1. This chapter applies the research
methodology and discusses the results. Specifically, this chapter provides an overview of
the demographics of the test subjects, presents and analyzes the results of the statistical
testing regime, provides a discussion of the interpretation of results, and presents
additional related findings.
4.2 Subject Demographics
Data on three demographic variables were collected. These variables included
age, gender and academic level (Table 3). These variables were gathered from 13
graduate students at the Air Force Institute of Technology and 12 undergraduate students
from Wright State University located in Dayton, Ohio. The majority of the subjects were
in the age groups 18-30 (64%). There were more male subjects (76%) than female
(24%). Thirty-six percent of the subjects did not have a degree, while 40% of the
subjects had a Bachelor.
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Table 3. Demographic information on subjects
Demographic Factor
Frequency
(N=25)
18-30
16
Age
30-45
8
45-60
1
Male
19
Gender
Female
6
No
Degree
9
Academic Associate
4
Level
Bachelor
10
Master
2

% of
total
64
32
4
76
24
36
16
40
8

4.3 Deviations in the Methodology
There were a few deviations in the methodology that are discussed below.
•

A total of 25 subjects participated in the experiment; however, the expected
number of data points was not collected. Each subject was to receive a total of 6
treatment conditions (Integrity, Availability and Confidentiality with and without
the treatment) for a total of 150 data points. However, the majority of the subjects
only received 4 of the 6 treatment conditions for a total of 96 data points shown in
Table 3.

The subject’s performance of the tasks was self-paced and limited to

two 30 minutes sessions. Because of this each subject did not receive the
expected number of treatment conditions. Additionally, 1 of the 25 subjects only
received half of the treatment conditions; hence, that subject was removed from
the sample size leaving a remaining 24. The median response times was taken for
all cyber incidents for each subject for the NOTAM (USAF) and pop-up (CIMIA)
excluding confidentiality. For example, if subject 4 responded to an integrity
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pop-up in 45 seconds and an availability pop-up in 210 seconds, the response time
recorded for the CIMIA incident notification process was 128 seconds. If only 1
of the 2 cyber incidents was received, that response time was recorded. Table 4
shows how the data was combined.
Table 4. Collected data points
Type of Cyber Incident
Integrity
Availability
Confidentiality
Total

Treatment Condition
Pop-up
21
20
9
50

NOTAM
22
19
5
46

Total
43
39
14
96

Table 5. Combined data points

Cyber Incidents
Total
•

Treatment Condition
NOTAM
Pop-up
13
11
13
11
26
22

Total
24
24
48

The dependent variable, response time, is not a normal distribution which violates
one of the fundamental assumptions of an ANOVA for the test to work properly
and yield good results. Therefore, in an attempt to normalize the distribution
somewhat, the response variable was transformed. A reciprocal transformation
was performed on the response variable for the combined data points based on the
formula: y’ = 1/y. Where y is the value of the original variable and y’ is the
value of the transformed variable used in the analyses for response time
(DeCoster, 2001; Field, 2005).
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4.4 Results
The research objective was to compare the USAF incident notification process to the
CIMIA incident notification process with respect to the response time to recognize and
take proper contingency actions following a cyber incident. Response time was
measured in terms of the length of time it took a subject to report that a cyber incident
had occurred. The main hypothesis for this research was developed based on the notion
that it is important to promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber
incidents in a timely manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and
assure their mission. The null and alternate hypotheses were:
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to interpret interaction effects and main
effects on response time of the type of incident notification (Type: NOTAM or Pop-up)
and the initial incident notification utilized by the subject during the experiment (Initial:
NOTAM or Pop-up). The interaction effect is between type of incident notification and
initial notification. The main effects are the response time difference between the types
of incident notification. Initial notification is the between-subjects variable with two
levels (NOTAM and Pop-up) shown in Table 5. The type of incident notification is the
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within-subjects variables with two levels (NOTAM and Pop-up) shown in Table 6.
These two independent variables had an effect on the dependent variable (response time),
called the main effect. Keppel (1980) suggests that the order of testing null hypotheses
should be in a rational sequence. The first step is to evaluate is the interaction before
analyzing main effects. The significance of this test determines the next step in the
analyses. According to Keppel (1980), a significant interaction requires further
interpretation of the data where as a non-significant interaction indicates two independent
variables. Figure 14 shows a non-significant interaction.

Table 6. Between-Subjects Factors
Between-Subjects Factors
Initial Notification

NOTAM

N
13

POP-UP

11

Table 7. Within-Subjects Factors
Within-Subjects Factors
Type of Incident Notification
NOTAM

Dependent Variable
NOTAM Response Time

POP-UP

POPUP Response Time
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Figure 15. Response Time Initial notification for NOTAM and Pop-up

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Response Time
Descriptive Statistics

NOTAM Response Time

POP-UP Response Time

Initial Notification
NOTAM

Mean
623

Standard
Deviation
322

N
13

POP-UP

358

278

11

Total
NOTAM

502
249

325
179

24
13

POP-UP

165

165

11

Total

211

174

24
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Table 9. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa
F
df1
df2
Significance
NOTAM
1.179
1
22
.289
POP-UP
.000
1
22
.991
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.
a. Design: Intercept + Initial Notification
Within Subjects Design: Type of Incident Notification

Table 10. Analysis of Variance for Response Time
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR RESPONSE TIME

SOURCE

DF

SS

MS

F

P

1

0.001

0.001

4.593

0.043

A*B

22

0.005

0.000

TYPE OF INCIDENT NOTIFICATION (C)

1

0.001

0.001

7.629

0.011

A*C

1

0.001

0.001

2.771

0.110

A*B*C

22

0.004

0.001

TOTAL

47

0.012

INTIAL NOTIFICATION (A)
SUBJECT (B)

Note: ANOVA is based on the reciprocal transformation data

Repeated measures ANOVA found that there was not an interaction between
initial notification and type of incident notification (F(1,22)=2.271, p = .110). This
indicates that the two independent variables are representative of simple effect tests.
Therefore, the next step in the analysis was to focus on the average effects of the two
independent variables and interpret the experimental results in terms of the main effects
shown in Table 8 (Keppel, 1980). The dependent variable, response time, was made
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more normal by the reciprocal function. There was homogeneity of variance between for
the NOTAM and Pop-up as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of error variances.
Simple main effects analysis showed that initial notification is significant using a
significance level of .05 (F(1,22) = 4.593, p =.043) and there is a difference between the
type of incident notification process using a significance level of .05 (F(1,22) =7.629, p
=.011). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that there is a
statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident notification processes in
the length of time required for mission personnel to recognize and take proper
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.
4.5 Additional Results
4.4.1

Workload Assessment

The NASA TLX workload assessment response variable is a percentage derived
from count data which violates one of the assumptions of using ANOVA. The most
important assumption is that the data are normally distributed with no imposed limits.
Clearly this is not true of percentages, which cannot be less than 0 nor more than 100.
Therefore, in an attempt to normalize the data, percentages were converted to arcsine
values. The arcsine transformation moves very low or very high values toward the
center, giving them more theoretical freedom to vary. An arcsine-square transformation
was performed on the response variable to make the percent data normal (Field, 2005).
The arcsine value used in the analyses is for amount of workload experienced. The
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assessment of subject’s workload during the experiment revealed that the overall
perceived workload experienced among subjects was consistent.

Figure 16. Workload score Initial Notification for NOTAM and Pop-up
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Workload score
Descriptive Statistics

NOTAM Workload

POP-UP Workload

Initial Notification
NOTAM

Mean
36.7296

Standard
Deviation
13.9583

N
13

POP-UP

40.9140

14.4112

11

Total

38.6475

14.0173

24

NOTAM

33.9759

16.0652

13

POP-UP

44.8942

10.4745

11

Total

38.9801

14.6028

24
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Table 12. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa
F
df1
df2
Significance
NOTAM
.017
1
22
.897
POP-UP
2.104
1
22
.161
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.
a. Design: Intercept + Initial Notification
Within Subjects Design: Type of Incident Notification

Table 13. Analysis of Variance Table for Workload
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR WORKLOAD
SOURCE

DF

SS

MS

F

P

1

679.522

679.522

1.931

0.179

A*B

22

7743.074

351.958

TYPE OF INCIDENT NOTIFICATION (C)

1

4.482

4.482

0.114

0.739

A*C

1

135.096

135.096

3.432

.077

A*B*C

22

866.085

39.368

TOTAL

47

9428.259

INTIAL NOTIFICATION (A)
SUBJECT (B)

Note: ANOVA is based on arcsine value

Figure 15 indicates that there is no interaction between the initial notification and
the type of incident notification. The dependent variable, workload score, was made
more normal by arcsine transformation. There was homogeneity of variance between the
NOTAM and Pop-up as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of error variances. The
ANOVA found that there is not a significant interaction using a significance level of .05
(F(1,22) = 3.432, p =.077) . Simple effects analysis showed that the main effect of initial
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notification on perceived workload was not significant (F(1,22) = 1.939, p = .0179) and
similarly, the main effect of the type of incident notification on perceived workload was
not significant (F(1,22) = .114, p = .0739). The marginal means for the amount of
workload experienced in the USAF incident notification process (38.6475) and the
proposed CIMIA incident notification process (38.9801) are not statistically different
(Table 9).
4.5.2 Questionnaire results
The post-questionnaire was used for a self-assessment to perform comparative
analysis of responses associated with each session. The following dependent variables of
interest were analyzed with respect to the presents of the CIMIA incident notification
process. There was one exception; the first question refers to an overall comfort level of
the experiment, not between sessions. A summation is shown using the sample mode and
median in Table 8. Overall, subjects were more comfortable during the second session of
the experiment, which was expected. In addition, a slight increase in performance is
indicated between sessions.

71

Table 14. Comparison of subject's self assessment
Lickert scale item
Subject comfort level with the experiment
Subject’s comfort level with session one
Subject’s comfort level with session two

Sample mode
7
5
7

Sample median
6
5
7

1
8
5
6
6
6

3
7
5
6
6
6

Subject’s perception of NOTAMs usefulness
Subject’s perception of CIMIA notification usefulness
Subject’s self-assessment of performance in session one
Subject’s confidence of performance rating in session two
Subject’s self-assessment of performance in session two
Subject’s confidence of performance rating in session one

Part of the questionnaire was also used to obtain an indirect measurement of SA.
Because subjective measures of SA are limited in the veracity of self-rating and observer
rating of SA (Endsley, 1995), the questionnaire asked questions directed at all three
levels of SA. Although, the questionnaire is not a validate technique for measuring SA, it
indicates subjects SA level based on their understanding of information available in the
experiment environment. A summary of the SA response measures are shown in Table
11.
Table 15. Summary of SA response measures

Response Measure
Subjects detected an error in data
Subjects perception of persons affected by cyber incident
Subjects notified someone of cyber incident
Subjects notified who they percieved to be affected by cyber incident
Notes:
1. Mean scores are compared by session.
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Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
w/o CIMIA w/CIMIA w/CIMIA w/o CIMIA

0.8461
3.5384
0.6923
1.5384

1
4.6153
0.923
2.6153

0.9897
4.4822
0.978
2.75

1
4.5333
0.9585
4.5825

4.6 Summary
A significant difference in the type of incident notification between the USAF
incident notification process and the proposed CIMIA incident notification process was
observed. Simple main effects analysis showed that there is a difference between the
type of incident notification process using a significance level of .05 (F(1,22) =7.629, p
=.011). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that there is a
statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident notification processes in
the length of time required for mission personnel to recognize and take proper
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. The proposed CIMIA incident
notification reduced response times by 58 percent. This reduction was a result
independent of whether or not the CIMIA notification was the initial notification in the
experiment. The additional findings from the NASA TLX workload assessment and
post-questionnaire suggest relative performance indicators in regards to the CIMIA
incident notification process and indirect measurements of SA. The following chapter
will discuss and interpret the results of this research and make recommendations for
future research.
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V. Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Review
The result of this research support the Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment
project, whose purpose is to provide decision makers with timely notification and
relevant mission impact estimation, from the instant an information incident is declared,
until the incident is fully remediated. This study demonstrated a proof-of-concept in that
it provided quantitative research to measure the effect of timely and relevant notification
for cyber incident response on mission objectives.
The case study focused on the top two mission objectives representative of those
found in an operational Maintenance Operations Center (MOC): 1) ensure aircraft status
is reported accurately, and 2) ensure all information is entered accurately and timely into
the Maintenance Management Information System (GO81). The case study provided
experimental control, but simultaneously allowed enough flexibility to perform
operational decision making tasks. This study objective was to compare the USAF
incident notification process to the CIMIA incident notification process approach by
evaluating both real-time response times following a cyber incident.
A hypothetical scenario was developed using a fictitious MOC to induce
manipulations that resulted in the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability posing
a security incident to critically dependent information and communications technologies
(ICT). The research evaluated the two incident notification processes by measuring the
response time from the time a cyber incident occurred until it was recognized and a
contingency action was taken by the subject.
74

5.2 Findings
The initial notification in the experiment contributed to the performance of the
subjects in the second session of the experiment. The initial notification was significant
(F(1, 22) = 4.593, p =.043), which indicates that subjects had a significantly better
response time overall with pop-up notification. The subjects that received the NOTAM
as the initial notification performed worse than the subjects that received the pop-up first.
Perhaps the subjects the received the pop-up first were just better at the task compared to
the subjects receiving the NOTAM initially. Alternatively, the pop-up could have been
some type of learning stimulus that contributed to improved performances that were
observed. Subject’s performance in response to the NOTAM in the second session of the
experiment was better after being exposed to the pop-up. In each instance, the pop-up
had a positive effect on performance, always encouraged better performance.
As predicted in Ha, the proposed CIMIA incident notification process had a
statistical difference in the response time for subjects to recognize and take proper
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents (F(1,22) =7.629, p =.011). The data
from the experimental conditions, shown in Table 5, provides insight that differentiates
the two incident notification processes. The proposed CIMIA incident notification
process reduces the response time as indicated in the mean thresholds. Subjects
performed better regardless of when the proposed CIMIA incident notification process
was received. The shortest response time was 11 seconds while the longest was 700.
There are several reasons that could possibly explain why subjects took longer to
respond:
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•

Subjects perhaps were inattentive because of the distractions in the experimental
environment (e.g. emails and radio communications).

•

Subjects perhaps did not completely understand the pop-up which required them
to investigate the information in their environment before responding. It may
have taken some subjects longer to recognize the meaning of the sensation,
mental processing time.

•

Subjects perhaps were trying to correct the discrepancies themselves before
responding.

•

Subjects perhaps did not have higher levels of SA immediately; they may not
have realized what was happening and what would happen by not responding
sooner.

These findings are consists with Ensley’s performance-based measures of SA.
Performance-based measurements evaluate the real-life actions of a subject and only
make inferences to SA. However, using direct testable response gives a more concise
measurement of SA, which “requires a discernible, identifiable action from the operator”
(Endsley, 2000, p.203). The fact that subjects had to observe what was going on in their
environment (information available), make an assessment about the current state
(information processing), and understand that an action was required (an alert) is an
indication of levels 1 and 2 of SA. According to Endsley, different measures of SA can
be defined by the points in the decision making process. Once subjects understood that
something was wrong in their environment, they made a decision about the projected
future state of the system and perceived a need to take a course of action. The actions
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taken by the subjects in response to the proposed CIMIA incident notification process are
testable responses that reinforce inferred higher levels of SA.
In response to the four questions that indirectly measured SA, the mean scores
increased in the second session of the experiment. As indicated by more errors being
detected, number of personnel identified to be affected by the cyber incident, whether
someone was notified, and persons actually notified of a cyber incident. Clearly, subjects
had higher levels of SA and performed more successfully in the second session of the
experiment which consequentially increased the number of discrepancies reported from
the induced manipulations of cyber attacks. Subjects that received the NOTAM initially
responded only 50 percent of the time to discrepancies, while 92 percent responded after
being exposed to the pop-up. Conversely, subjects that were exposed to the pop-up
initially responded 92 percent of the time to discrepancies and performance increased in
the second session with 100 percent. Having the proposed CIMIA incident notification
process initially perhaps alerted the subject to search more closely for discrepancies in
the second session of the experiment.
The subjects preferred the proposed CIMIA incident notification process over the
USAF incident notification process (rated not very useful). Based on the results from the
post-questionnaire (reference Table 10), subject responses to the usefulness of the pop-up
was extremely positive. This indicates that the subjects found the pop-up useful to
identify discrepancies and improve their level of SA based on their performance and
response time.
The NASA TLX workload assessment did not differ between the type of incident
notification (F(1,22) = .114, p = .0739). This indicates that the proposed CIMIA incident
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notification process did not manifest as increases or decreases in workload. Although the
proposed CIMIA incident notification process improved performance there was no
change in subjective measures of workload. The task demand between sessions of the
experiment did not change, which in turn would not cause the subject to exert more
effort, thereby not affecting their perceived workload. This suggests that the assessment
of the workload is not sensitive to the type of incident notification. In addition, subjects
could have perceived the tasks as easy and not have associated the type of incident
notification with perceived workload. The performance-workload association is
interesting in that increased performance is observed but not accompanied by increased
workload. It was expected that workload manifest in terms of the amount of information
to be processed for subject to have higher levels of SA.
Finally, analysis was conducted on all demographic factors. No demographic
factors segregate itself significantly among the sample population (e.g. age, gender or
academic level).
5.3 Limitations
Overall, the subjects performed significantly better than expected with the
proposed CIMIA incident notification process than the USAF incident notification
process. The response rate increased 58 percent with the CIMIA incident notification
process. However, this study was limited in several ways because of the scarcity of
subjects.
A limitation to this study exists within the sampling population in that only 25
subjects participated, with the majority being freshmen from a civilian institute.
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Although the CIMIA project is being developed for a military environment, it is expected
to provide utility to any organization that exhibits critical temporal mission-toinformation dependencies (Grimaila et al., 2009b). The sample population was not
entirely representative of the general public and did not equate to personnel in operational
positions.
As stated before, the within-subject design was selected because of the scarcity of
subjects. All subjects performed moderately better in the second session than the first
session of the experiment, which could have been the result of a carryover effect. Keppel
(1980) suggest that the “primary problem is the influence on the subjects’ behavior of
residual effects from previous conditions combing with the currently administered
treatment” (p.177). Therefore, it is not always clearly distinguishable which particular
condition may have caused a response. In such a case, the proposed CIMIA incident
notification process could have alerted a subject to a sense of urgency. In addition, the
use of a within-subject design also limited the number of intended treatments.
The experimental design originally was suppose to test all three adverse events
that threaten CIA. However, the majority of the subjects only received the loss of
availability and loss of integrity. 78 percent experienced an availability breach while 86
percent experienced an integrity breach. In comparison, only 28 percent received a
confidentiality breach. The cyber incidents occurred based on the subject’s performance
to progress through the datasheets within the 30 minutes for each session. The cyber
incidents occurred two minutes after sheets 5, 9, and 13 were entered (see Figure 10). If
subjects did not progress through the specific number of datasheets, the cyber incident
did not occur.
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A final limitation of this study was that only one facilitator was available during
the actual experiment. Because subjects were being evaluated on their response times to
recognize and take proper contingency actions following a cyber incident, a telephone
was used to report discrepancies. Hence, subjects had an option of placing a call to six
different extension numbers. However, the same facilitator was the receiver of the call at
every extension number in the same room. This was noted as a limitation because it
made the experiment seem unrealistic to the subjects.
5.4 Contributions to Research
The data collected has determined the efficacy of having a DSS in place to
monitor the status of critical ICT. The results of this research confirm positive empirical
results, one future outcome would be to replace the manual effort required to coordinate
with system owners and custodians to determine which organizations are potentially
affected by a cyber incident. As a result, this research effort can be operationalized by
infusing a reliable CIMIA incident notification process into the workplace, where deemed
appropriate, improving the push method utilized by the USAF. By doing so,
organizations would benefit from real-time notification following a cyber incident.
5.5 Future Research Recommendations
One important direction for research is to conduct more experiments that examine
actual SA. This will enable direct evaluation of the effects of the proposed concepts of
CIMIA to enhance SA. According to Endsley, without a more direct evaluation it will be
impossible to tell if a proposed concept actually helps SA or inadvertently compromises
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it in some way. The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique is one technique
that has demonstrated reliability as a measure of SA in empirical investigation (Endsley,
1995). It is used to capture an operator’s SA as an objective means by which to quantify
SA. The subjective measures of SA or indirect measures of SA used in this study are not
true presentations of actual SA.
A second direction is to more closely examine the nature of the tasks used. There
needs to be more research on the results of not receiving or responding to an incident
notification to determine mission impact estimation. This will allow further investigation
into the concepts of CIMIA in that the length of time required for mission personnel to
recognize and take proper contingency action in response to cyber incidents is time
sensitive to reduce mission impact.
Because the subjects in this study were novices and did not have operational
backgrounds, one could argue that the CIMIA incident notification process adapted the
subjects to a sense of urgency to take a contingency action. Subjects could have
responded by chance resulting in a lower level of SA, not correctly perceiving pieces of
information in the situation. Further research is needed on the CIMIA incident
notification process by personnel in a specific domain to evaluate the development of
higher levels of cyber SA.
A final recommendation for future research is a more robust experimental design.
The experimental design selected in this study examined the mean of within-subjects
responses to the two incident notification processes. A fundamental disadvantage of
within-subjects designs is carryover effects. Increased performance was observed in the
second session of the experiment for subject that received the pop-up initially.
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Therefore, further research is needed with a between-subject design to eliminate the
possibility of carryover effects.
5.6 Conclusion
The AF has recognized that it must defend cyberspace from increasing threats and
attacks against critical information and communication technologies (ICT) aimed at the
manipulation or destruction of information. The Air Force has taken several steps to
mitigate these threats and dominate operations in the cyberspace domain by developing
cyberspace forces and capabilities to organize, train and equip a full range of defensive
operations. Cyberspace combat and support forces have been consolidated under the
24th Air Force component of the Air Force Space Command to protect the information
realm which is a central component of the way decision makers fight wars. However,
today cyberspace is experiencing a time of increasing threats to information caused by
inadequate cyber security. One major problem is decision makers may or may not be
notified when a cyber incident occurs and not understand the relevance of received
notifications to maintain situation awareness of potential and actual impact to their
mission. As a result, ICT are at risk of a cyber attack that compromise confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) of embedded information. These types of threats against
the information used by decision makers for day-to-day operations can have real mission
impact consequences that range from severe degradation to mission failure. This threat
is steadily increasing as adversaries operate in cyberspace. They would like nothing
more than to gain access to critical ICT that decision makers depend on for mission
accomplishment. Having this dependence requires that decision makers have adequate
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status of the critical ICT entrusted to maintain mission objectives. Specifically,
preemptive actions are required for decision makers to effectively secure the information
assets they depend on and ensure information dominance.
Maintaining information dominance, the ability to collect, control, exploit and
defend while denying an adversary the ability to do the same, must be the focus of
decision maker’s to deny an adversary cyberspace sanctuary. Dominance of information
operations is an important strategic characteristic of cyberspace. Thus, it is important to
utilize technologies to reduce threats and attacks on critical information assets, and to
help allow for decision makers to maintain SA.
The results of this research challenges decision makers to take a closer look their
information dependencies and exploit automation to maintain cyber SA. A paradigm
shift is required to have a true appreciation for potential mission impacts following a
cyber incident. Asset identification must be achieved through some type of risk
assessment which explicitly documents and identifies information assets, information
valuation, and mission-to-information dependencies. Therefore, the use of a
methodology such CIMIA can be implemented improve the timely notification of
downstream information consumers following a cyber incident.
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